Tag Archives: Mosman Lawyers

Mosman Lawyers

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34; 59 ALJR 492; 59 ALR 529 (29 May 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/34.html

“The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, i.e. of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (Pennington v. Norris [1956] HCA 26; (1956) 96 CLR 10, at p 16) and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage: Stapley v. Gypsum Mines Ltd. [1953] UKHL 4; (1953) AC 663, at p 682; Smith v. McIntyre [1958] TASStRp 11; (1958) Tas.SR 36, at pp 42-49 and Broadhurst v. Millman [1976] VicRp 15; (1976) VR 208, at p 219 and cases there cited. It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination. The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case; for example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance.”

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Re Bevanere Pty Limited v Gaetan Djino Lubidineuse [1985] FCA 134

Re Bevanere Pty Limited v Gaetan Djino Lubidineuse; Suzette Mauricette Lubidineuse; Robert Gervais Lezare and Brigitte Margareet Lezare [1985] FCA 134; (1985) 7 FCR 325; 59 ALR 334 (1985) Atpr Para 40 – 565 (24 April 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1985/134.html

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Sydney, Australia

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R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22

ON 26 MARCH 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22; (1985) 156 CLR 464 (26 March 1985).  Douglas Crabbe killed five people and injured many more when he drove a Mack truck into a bar at Uluru after being refused service of alcohol. He was tried for murder on the grounds of recklessness as opposed to intent.

“…a person who, without lawful justification or excuse, does an act knowing that it is probable that death or grievous bodily harm will result, is guilty of murder if death in fact results.”

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Sydney, Australia

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Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) [1985] HCA 8

ON 27 FEBRUARY 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) [1985] HCA 8; (1985) 159 CLR 351 (27 February 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/8.html

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Sydney, Australia

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Hackshaw v Shaw [1984] HCA 84

ON 11 DECEBER 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Hackshaw v Shaw [1984] HCA 84; (1984) 155 CLR 614 (11 December 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/84.html

An occupier of land owes a duty of care to a trespasser if it is foreseeable that the trespasser could be injured by the occupier’s negligence.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/poteoa1997455

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Sydney, Australia

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Re Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green [1984] HCA 82

Re Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green [1984] HCA 82; (1984) 156 CLR 185 (6 December 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/156clr185.html

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Sydney, Australia

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Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64

ON 25 OCTOBER 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 (25 October 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/64.html

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Sydney, Australia

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Kondis v State Transport Authority (formerly Victorian Railways Board) [1984] HCA 61

ON 16 OCTOBER 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Kondis v State Transport Authority (formerly Victorian Railways Board) [1984] HCA 61; (1984) 154 CLR 672 (16 October 1984).

The High Court ruled that a special duty of care by an employer to an employee to provide a safe system of work is non-delegable.

The Victorian State Transit Authority engaged an independent contractor to dismantle a crane in a railway yard. Kondis injured his back when a metal pin fell from the crane. Kondis sued the State Transit Authority. The High Court held that the State Transit Authority, as employer, was liable for the harm caused by the independent contractor because their failure to adopt a safe system of work was a breach of the employer’s non-delegable duty of care.

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Jaensch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52

ON 20 AUGUST 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Jaensch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52; (1984) 155 CLR 549 (20 August 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/52.html

A plaintiff suffered nervous shock when immediately after an accident she saw her injured husband in hospital and was told of the seriousness of his injuries.

The High Court extended the class of persons to whom a duty of care is owed to those who, although not present at the scene of an accident, are at risk of suffering psychiatric injury by personally perceiving the direct and immediate aftermath of the accident in which a person with whom they are in a “close or intimate relationship” with is negligently injured or killed.

The duty of care was characterised as arising from the injury being reasonably foreseeable and sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant.

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Lowe v R [1984] 154 CLR 606

ON 2 AUGUST 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Lowe v R [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606 (2 August 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/46.html

The case sets out the principle of due proportionality to be imposed by Australian courts when sentencing criminal offenders.

Whilst co-offenders do not have to receive the same sentence for the same offence, any discrepancy must not give the sense or appearance of their being an injustice done to the offender with the heavier sentence.

At 623, Dawson J (with whom WIlson J agreed) said:

“There is no rule of law which requires co-offenders to be given the same sentence for the same offence even if no distinction can be drawn between them. Obviously where the circumstances of each offender or his involvement in the offence are different then different sentences may be called for but justice should be even-handed and it has come to be recognised both here and in England that any difference between the sentences imposed upon co-offenders for the same offence ought not to be such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of a grievance on the part of the offender with the heavier sentence or to give the appearance that justice has not been done.”

The principle is an application of the fundamental principle of equality of justice. At 610, Mason J observed:

“Just as consistency in punishment — a reflection of the notion of equal justice — is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. It is for this reason that the avoidance and elimination of unjustifiable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding importance to the administration of justice and to the community.”

The parity principle only applies to co-offenders: per Gibbs CJ at 609, Mason J at 611 and Brennan J at 617-618.

Disparity may be an indicator of appelable error: per Brennan J at 617-618.

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