Tag Archives: Mosman Lawyers

Mosman Lawyers

Calling for expressions of interest

At Legal Helpdesk Lawyers, we are always looking for reliable lawyers with suitable expertise to receive our customer referrals.

If you share our values and would like to join our network, please send your expression of interest to Peter O’Grady at peter@legalhelpdesklawyers.com.au. Please include all information and material you would like us to consider, including particulars of your firm, experience, expertise and referees.

It is essential that the lawyers in our network meet high standards of expertise, reliability and peer respect. Our network includes some of the best Solicitors and Barristers in Sydney.

 

Lawyers

1300 00 2088

Parramatta City Council v Pestell [1972] HCA 59 | 24 November 1972

Parramatta City Council v Pestell [1972] HCA 59; (1972) 128 CLR 305 (24 November 1972).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/128clr305.html

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

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Salacup and Salacup [1993] FamCA 120 | 23 November 1993

Salacup and Salacup [1993] FamCA 120; (1993) FLC 92-431 (23 November 1993).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FamCA/1993/120.html

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

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Crampton v R [2000] HCA 60 | 23 November 2000

ON 23 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Crampton v R [2000] HCA 60; 206 CLR 161; 176 ALR 369; 75 ALJR 133 (23 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/60.html

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

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Bugden v Rogers (1993) Aust Tort Reports 81-246 | 23 November 2003

ON 23 NOVEMBER 1993, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered Bugden v Rogers (1993) Aust Tort Reports 81-246.

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61 | 23 November 2000

ON 23 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; 205 CLR 254; 176 ALR 411; 75 ALJR 164 (23 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/61.html

 

The High Court held that the owner/occupier of a shopping centre did not breach its duty of care to an employee of a tenant who was attacked in the unlit shopping centre car park.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“That an occupier of land owes a duty of care to a person lawfully upon the land is not in doubt. It is clear that the appellant owed the first respondent a duty in relation to the physical state and condition of the car park. The point of debate concerns whether the appellant owed a duty of a kind relevant to the harm which befell the first respondent. That was variously described in argument as a question concerning the nature, or scope, or measure of the duty. The nature of the harm suffered was physical injury inflicted by a third party over whose actions the appellant had no control. Thus, any relevant duty must have been a duty related to the security of the first respondent. It must have been a duty, as occupier of land, to take reasonable care to protect people in the position of the first respondent from conduct, including criminal conduct, of third parties.” at [17]

“The most that can be said of the present case is that the risk of harm of the kind suffered by the first respondent was foreseeable in the sense that it was real and not far-fetched. The existence of such a risk is not sufficient to impose upon an occupier of land a duty to take reasonable care to prevent harm, to somebody lawfully upon the land, from the criminal behaviour of a third party who comes onto the land. To impose such a burden upon occupiers of land, in the absence of contract or some special relationship …, would be contrary to principle; a principle which is based upon considerations of practicality and fairness. The principle cannot be negated by listing all the particular facts of the case and applying to the sum of them the question-begging characterisation that they are special. … Most of the facts said to make the case special are, upon analysis, no more than evidence that the risk of harm to the first respondent was foreseeable.” [at 35]

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

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Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58 | 19 November 1992

ON 19 NOVEMBER 1992, the High Court of Australia delivered Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479 (19 November 1992).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/58.html

Dr Rogers had performed surgery on Whitaker’s right eye, which was almost blind. The surgery should have restored her sight, but instead became blind in the left eye when she suffered sympathetic opthalmia. Whilst the risk was remote, Dr Rogers was held to be negligent in failing to warn Whitaker of the risk.

Lawyers

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Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58 | 17 November 1976

Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; (1976) 136 CLR 106 (17 November 1976).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/136clr106.html

A statutory authority with the power to affect the rights of a person must hear from the person before exercising the power.

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53 | 16 November 1989

ON 16 NOVEMBER 1989, the High Court of Australia delivered Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461 (16 November 1989).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1989/53.html

Section 117 of the Australian Constitution provides: “A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State”.

The Rules of Court for Barristers applying for admission in Queensland were held to not apply to Mr Street as they contravened s117 of the Constitution by requiring him to have an intention of practising principally in Queensland.

Lawyers

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Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56| 16 November 2000

ON 16 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56; 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137; 75 ALJR 1 (16 November 2000).

Jones was an adult who received serious injuries when he walked through an interior glass door at the house where he lived with his parents. The house was rented from Bartlett and another by the plaintiff’s parents.

Jones sued Bartlett for damages, alleging negligence, breach of statutory duty and breach of contract. The District Court awarded Jones damages, holding that Bartlett was negligent. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowed an appeal. Jones then appealed to the High Court, who dismissed his appeal.

The High Court found that the premises were not defective and held that there was no negligence, breach of statutory duty or breach of duty of care on the part of Bartlett.

A landlord’s duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury does not require it to make residential premises as safe as reasonable care could make them: per Gaudron J at [87]. The duty owed to the tenants concerns what a reasonable person would do in response to a foreseeable risk of injury.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“There is no ground in principle for imposing upon the respondents an obligation greater than an obligation to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to their prospective tenants and members of their household. The critical question is as to what is reasonable. The judgment of the Full Court, with which I agree, to the effect that there was no failure to take reasonable care, was a judgment of fact. It cannot be circumvented by an attempt to formulate the legal duty with greater particularity, in a manner which seeks to pre-empt the decision as to reasonableness.” at [57].

“There is no such thing as absolute safety. All residential premises contain hazards to their occupants and to visitors. Most dwelling houses could be made safer, if safety were the only consideration. The fact that a house could be made safer does not mean it is dangerous or defective. Safety standards imposed by legislation or regulation recognise a need to balance safety with other factors, including cost, convenience, aesthetics and practicality.The standards in force at the time of the lease reflect this. They did not require thicker or tougher glass to be put into the door that caused the injury unless, for some reason, the glass had to be replaced. That, it is true, is merely the way the standards were framed, and it does not pre-empt the common law. But it reflects common sense. ” at [23].


 

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