Tag Archives: SYDNEY LAWYERS

Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5 | 4 March 1987

ON THIS DAY IN 1987, the High Court of Australia delivered Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5; (1987) 162 CLR 221 (4 March 1987). http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1987/5.html A builder was entitled to recover remuneration for building work done despite there being no written enforceable contract because the client had accepted the benefit and therefore was obliged under the doctrine of unjust enrichment or restitution to pay fair and just compensation for the benefit accrued.

Section 45 of the Builders Licensing Act 1971 (NSW) (which provided that a building contract is not enforceable unless in writing and signed) did not prevent a builder from bringing an action in quantum merit (“as much as he has earned”) for the work done and materials supplied.

A claim based upon quantum merit does not require there to be an implied contract. A claim in quantum meruit is based upon restitution or unjust enrichment.

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Markakis v Mosman Council [2015] NSWLEC 1033

ON 3 MARCH 2015, the NSW Land and Environment Court delivered Markakis v Mosman Council [2015] NSWLEC 1033 (3 March 2015).

“DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION: two storey dwelling; inappropriate siting of dwelling on battle-axe site; inadequate landscaped area; impacts on adjoining dwellings; internal amenity; resolution of shared parts of site with adjoining property.”

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2015/1033.html

The Court dismissed an appeal against a decision of Mosman Council to refuse a Development Application for a two storey dwelling at 103A Raglan Street, Mosman.

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Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8 | 3 March 1956

ON THIS DAY IN 1959, the High Court delivered Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 (3 March 1959).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1959/8.html

The unexplained failure of a party to use certain evidence may, in some circumstances, result in an inference that the evidence would not have assisted their case.

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R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (“Boilermakers’ case”) [1956] HCA 10 | 2 MARCH 1956

ON THIS DAY IN 1956, the High Court of Australia delivered R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (“Boilermakers’ case”) [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 (2 March 1956).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/10.html

The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The court was vested it with federal executive powers under s51(xxv) of the Australian Constitution regarding “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State”. The court also exercised federal judicial jurisdiction and power as a court under Chapter III of the Constitution.

The High Court ruled that the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was unconstitutional because it conferred non-judicial functions on a Chapter III court.

The decision confirmed the doctrine of separation of powers in the Constitution by the rule that it is unconstitutional for non-judicial power to be conferred on a Chapter III court.

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Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803) | 24 February 1803

ON THIS DAY IN 1803, the US Supreme Court delivered Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803).

http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/us/vol/getcase/US/5/137.html

The Supreme Court of the United States held invalid legislation passed by Congress which purported to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by authorising the issue of mandamus. The Court held that Congress had no power to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases other than those described in Art III.

The decision is significant in that it sets the principle that the US Supreme Court has the ultimate power to review the validity of acts of Congress enacted in violation of the United States Constitution.

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Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EWHC Exch J70 | 23 February 1854

ON THIS DAY IN 1854, the Court of Exchequer Chamber delivered Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EWHC Exch J70
(1854) 9 Ex Ch 341; 156 ER 145 (23 February 1854).

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Exch/1854/J70.html

The decision lays down the rule for assessing damages for breach of contract. There are two limbs: (1) losses which “may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself”; or (2) losses which “may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it”.

Per Alderson B:

“Now we think the proper rule is such as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made where communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. The Judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury, that, upon the fats then before them, they ought not to take the loss of profits into consideration at all in estimating the damages. There must therefore be a new trial in this case.”

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Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7 | 19 February 1988

Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7; (1988) 164 CLR 387 (19 February 1988).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/7.html

Maher owned a commercial property at Nowra. Waltons was a national department store. Waltons and Maher entered into negotiations regarding the lease of Maher’s property conditional upon Maher demolishing the existing building and constructing a new one in accordance with Waltons’ requriements.

Waltons provided Maher with a draft lease contract. Maher suggested amendments and indicated they needed to complete the agreement in the next day or so in order to arrange building supplies before Christmas. Maher indicated that he did not want to demolish the building until he knew there was no problem with the lease. The solicitor for Waltons said to Maher that Waltons had informed him that the amendments were acceptable but would obtain formal instructions and inform him by the next day if they did not agree with any of the amendments. The solicitor for Waltons then sent Maher’s solicitor a redrafted lease with the suggested amendments and did not object to the amendments the next day, or at all. Maher then sent Waltons an executed lease by way of exchange and then proceeded with the demolition. A week later, Waltons had concerns about the transaction and, not having exchanged their counterpart of the lease, instructed their solicitor to go slow. Waltons then became aware that the building had been demolished and when the new building was 40% completed advised Maher that they did not wish to proceed with the transaction.

Maher sued Waltons in the Supreme Court of NSW, obtaining an order for specific performance or damages in lieu. An appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal was dismissed, as was an appeal to the High Court of Australia.

Per Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJJ, Waltons was bound to enter into a lease agreement and estopped from denying an implied promise to complete the contract as it would be unconscionable for Waltons to take a course of inaction that exposed Maher to detriment by acting on a false assumption.

The High Court brought together proprietary and promissory estoppel under the broader principle of equitable estoppel. When a person makes a non-contractual or voluntary promise and knowingly induces the other party to act to his or her detriment in reliance on that promise, that person is precluded from resiling from the promise without avoiding the detriment. The person who makes the promise is liable to either honour the promise or avoid detriment to the other party.

Per Brennan J at 428-9:

“In my opinion, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and the defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant has induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff’s action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise. For the purposes of the second element, a defendant who has not actively induced the plaintiff to adopt an assumption or expectation will nevertheless be held to have done so if the assumption or expectation can be fulfilled only by a transfer of the defendant’s property, a diminution of his rights or an increase in his obligations and he, knowing that the plaintiff’s reliance on the assumption or expectation may cause detriment to the plaintiff if it is not fulfilled, fails to deny to the plaintiff the correctness of the assumption or expectation on which the plaintiff is conducting his affairs.”

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Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5 | 16 February 1995

ON THIS DAY IN 1995, the High Court of Australia delivered Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1; (1995) 127 ALR 180 (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322 (16 February 1995).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/5.html

Per Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said at [6]:

“For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question whether the requisite causal connexion exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is essentially one of fact to be resolved, on the probabilities, as a matter of commonsense and experience. And that remains so in a case such as the present where the question of the existence of the requisite causal connexion is complicated by the intervention of some act or decision of the plaintiff …which constitutes a more immediate cause of the loss or damage. … If, in such a case, it can be seen that the necessary causal connexion would exist if the intervening act or decision be disregarded, the question of causation may often be conveniently expressed in terms of whether the intrusion of that act or decision has had the effect of breaking the chain of causation which would otherwise have existed between the breach of duty and the particular loss or damage. The ultimate question must, however, always be whether, notwithstanding the intervention of the subsequent decision, the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is, as between the plaintiff and the defendant and as a matter of commonsense and experience, properly to be seen as having caused the relevant loss or damage. Indeed, in some cases, it may be potentially misleading to pose the question of causation in terms of whether an intervening act or decision has interrupted or broken a chain of causation which would otherwise have existed. An example of such a case is where the negligent act or omission was itself a direct or indirect contributing cause of the intervening act or decision.”

Per McHugh J at [20]:

“However, the ultimate question is whether, as a matter of common sense, the financial loss that the plaintiff has suffered was caused by the plaintiff’s act in resigning his office rather than by the defendant’s negligence.”

Per McHugh J at [23]:

“The plaintiff’s complaints of pain and fatigue, his decreasing confidence in his own abilities, his belief that he was no longer teaching as well as he was before the accident and his inability to find time for research combine to make a strong case for concluding that his early retirement was not unreasonable. A defendant cannot reasonably require a plaintiff to remain in employment for the purpose of reducing the damages that the defendant would otherwise have to pay if to do so would interfere with the plaintiff’s reasonable enjoyment of life. The doctrine of mitigation of loss was not intended to turn injured plaintiffs into economic slaves.”

 

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North Sydney Local Court Lawyers

LEGAL HELPDESK LAWYERS is a new generation private legal practice that offers legal guidance to individuals and businesses in Sydney’s Lower North Shore and Northern Beaches.

We provide information, advice and advocacy to those who need – or might need – legal representation in any area of law.

If required, we refer customers to a reliable network of specialist lawyers. We take the guesswork out of finding a good lawyer.

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Our mission is to promote better local access to good legal help.

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Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1 | 13 February 1986

ON THIS DAY IN 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html

Per Mason J at 24:

“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the
importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):

“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”

But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of
a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of
remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”

Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:

“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”

Per Brennan J:

“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”

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