ON THIS DAY in 2007, the Federal Court of Australia delivered Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273 (21 August 2007).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1273.html
Sydney, Australia
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ON THIS DAY in 2007, the Federal Court of Australia delivered Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273 (21 August 2007).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1273.html
Sydney, Australia
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ON 20 AUGUST 2002, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal delivered R v Whyte [2002] NSWCCA 343 (20 August 2002).
Whyte was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and three months, with a non-parole period of 12 months, after pleading guilty to one charge of aggravated dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm (s52A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)). The Crown appealed against the sentence to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA).
The CCA determined that the sentence was manifestly inadequate but exercised its discretion not to interfere.
The CCA delivered a guideline judgment with respect to sentencing for breach of s52A.
The CCA ruled that “A custodial sentence will usually be appropriate unless the offender has a low level of moral culpability, as in the case of momentary inattention or misjudgement.”
For typical cases involving high moral culpability, “…a full time custodial head sentence of less than three years (in the case of death) and two years (in the case of grievous bodily harm) would not generally be appropriate.”
A typical case was one which was considered to involve:
An appropriate increment is required for aggravating factors, which include:
The guideline focuses on objective circumstances of the offence. The subjective circumstances of the offender must also be considered.
The CCA (Spigelman CJ, Mason P, Barr, Bell and McClellan JJ) confirmed the validity of guideline judgments in NSW. The court ruled that ss 21A(4), 42A and 37A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 require a sentencing judge to follow a guideline judgment given by the Court of Criminal Appeal and that such a judgment ought to have the force of legislation.
The CCA said that numerical guidelines provide adequacy and consistency of sentencing where there is a tension between individualised justice and the principle of consistency.
The guideline is not a “rule” or “presumption” but a “check” or “sounding board”.
If a sentencing judge does not apply a guideline, reasons should be given.
ON 20 AUGUST 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Jaensch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52; (1984) 155 CLR 549 (20 August 1984).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/52.html
A plaintiff suffered nervous shock when immediately after an accident she saw her injured husband in hospital and was told of the seriousness of his injuries.
The High Court extended the class of persons to whom a duty of care is owed to those who, although not present at the scene of an accident, are at risk of suffering psychiatric injury by personally perceiving the direct and immediate aftermath of the accident in which a person with whom they are in a “close or intimate relationship” with is negligently injured or killed.
The duty of care was characterised as arising from the injury being reasonably foreseeable and sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Sydney, Australia
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Disputes between neighbours concerning trees may be resolved through proceedings in the NSW Land and Environment Court.
The Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW), which commenced on 2 February 2007, creates a statutory scheme that partially takes away the right to bring a common law action in nuisance over disputes about trees in adjoining properties (s5).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/tbna2006363/
Applicants may apply for orders with respect to trees that cause or are likely to cause damage or injury (Part 2) and high hedges that obstruct sunlight or views (Part 2A).
Part 2 orders for trees that cause or are likely to cause damage or injury
A land owner may make an application to the Land and Environment Court for an order to remedy, restrain or prevent damage to property or personal injury as a result of a tree situated on adjoining land (s7) that is zoned residential, rural-residential, village, township, industrial or business but not land that is managed by a council (s4).
The court must not make an order unless it is satisfied that the applicant has made a reasonable effort to reach an agreement with the owner of the land (s10(1)(a)) and has given notice in accordance with the Act (s10(1)(b)).
The court must not make an order unless it is satisfied that the tree has caused, is causing, or is likely in the near future to cause, damage to the applicant’s property (s10(2)(a)), or is likely to cause injury to any person (s10(2)(b)).
In making its determination, the court is to consider the following matters (s12):
Part 2A orders for high hedges that obstruct sunlight or views
A landowner may make an application to the Land and Environment Court for an order to remedy, restrain or prevent a severe obstruction of sunlight to a window of a dwelling situated on the land (s14B(a)), or any view from a dwelling situated on the land (s14B(b)), if the obstruction occurs as a consequence of trees planted in groups of two or more that are planted to form a hedge (s14A(1)(a)) and rise to a height of at least 2.5 metres above existing ground level (s14A(1)(b)), except for trees on rural-residential land or crown land.
The court must not make an order unless it is satisfied that the applicant has made a reasonable effort to reach an agreement with the owner of the land (s14E(1)(a)) and has given notice in accordance with the Act (s14E(1)(b)).
The court must not make an order unless it is satisfied the trees are severely obstructing sunlight to a window of a dwelling situated on the applicant’s land (s14D(1)(a)(i)) or are severely obstructing a view from a dwelling situated on the applicant’s land (s14D(1)(a)(ii)) and the severity and nature of the obstruction is such that the applicant’s interest in having the obstruction removed, remedied or restrained outweighs any other matters that suggest the undesirability of disturbing or interfering with the trees by making an order (s14D(1)(b)).
In making its determination, the court is to consider the following matters (s14F):
Procedure
Applications may be made to the Land and Environment Court or the Local Court and are considered by a Commissioner of the Land and Environment Court.
The court sets a preliminary conference which is an informal conciliation conference, often held by telephone. If an agreement cannot be reached, a second hearing is held on site with a decision often made on site with written reasons provided 3 or 4 weeks later.
Orders of the court are provided to the parties and the relevant Local Court and the Heritage Council if it was a party to the proceedings. The Local Court is required to list the orders on planning certificates relating to the land.
Enforcement
Failure to comply with an order carries a maximum penalty of $1,100 (s15(1)). Proceedings for an offence may be brought in the summary jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court (s15(2)).
Successors in title to the land are bound by the orders if the work has not been carried out (s16). The immediate successor in title to the applicants is entitled to the benefits of the order (s17).
The Local Council may, with notice, enter the land and perform the works that have not been carried out and then recover their reasonable costs (s17). A judgment debt in favour of the council may be lodged as a charge on the land (s17A).
Form more information go to http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec/types_of_disputes/class_2/trees_and_hedges.html.
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The NSW Attorney General has announced the appointments of Claire Girotto, Erin Kennedy and Philip Stewart as magistrates of the Local Court of NSW.
Ms Girotto was admitted to practice in 1990. She has worked for the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions for almost 25 years in Sydney and Wollongong. In the past 11 years she has managed the DPP’s Solicitor’s Office.
Ms Kennedy was admitted as a solicitor in 1995. She worked as a barrister for 14 years and in the last two years was a trial advocate for the Director of Public Prosecutions, prosecuting in criminal trials and sentencing hearings in the District Court at Parramatta and Gosford.
Mr Stewart was admitted as a solicitor in 1998 and has worked for Nyman Gibson Stewart, becoming a partner in 2002. Before he joined the legal profession he was a police officer for 14 years.
Ms Girotto will be sworn in on 25 August 2014 at 9.00am in Court 5.2 of the Downing Centre Local Court. Ms Kennedy and Mr Stewart will be sworn in on 8 September 2014.
Sydney, Australia
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ON 5 AUGUST 2014, the NSW Premier and Attorney General announced changes to the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) following a review by former Attorney General, John Hatzistergos.
The changes will be introduced during the current session of parliament and will include:
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Seven Up Company v OT Ltd [1947] HCA 59; (1947) 75 CLR 203 (19 August 1947).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1947/59.html
The Seven Up Company, the US owner of the US soft drink trademark “7 UP” brought a motion to remove the Australian owned name “8 Up” from the Australian register of trademarks. Williams J dismissed the motion and an appeal to the Full Court was dismissed.
Per Williams J:
“… in the absence of fraud it is not unlawful for a trader to become the registered proprietor under the Trade Marks Act of a mark which has been used, however extensively, by another trader as a mark for similar goods in a foreign country, provided the foreign mark has not been used at all in Australia at the date of the application for registration. But the position is different if at that date the mark has become identified with the goods of the foreign trader in Australia because those goods have been brought into Australia by the foreign trader himself or by some importer or in some other manner. The court frowns upon any attempt by one trader to appropriate the mark of another trader although that trader is a foreign trader and the mark has only been used by him in a foreign country. It therefore seizes upon a very small amount of use of the foreign mark in Australia to hold that it has become identified with and distinctive of the goods of the foreign trader in Australia. It is not then a mark which another trader is entitled to apply to register under the Trade Marks Act because it is not his property but the property of the foreign trader. The registrar is entitled to refuse to register the mark for such goods. If it has been registered the court may rectify the register on the ground that the mark is wrongly entered on the register.”
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ON 18 AUGUST 1933, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant [1933] HCA 35; (1933) 50 CLR 387 (18 August 1933).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1933/35.html
Per Dixon J at 418:
“The condition that goods are of merchantable quality requires that they should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition would buy them without abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and without special terms.”
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ON 17 AUGUST 1936, the High Court of Australia delivered House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 (17 August 1936).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/40.html
The exercise of a judge’s discretion may be reviewed on appeal if the judge:
If there is no identifiable error, but if upon the facts the exercise of discretion is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”, an appeal court may infer that the judge has failed to properly exercise his or her discretion on the grounds that a substantial wrong has occurred.
Peter Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ:
“The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.”
Sydney, Australia
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