Tag Archives: LOWER NORTH SHORE

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63

ON 7 DECEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337; 176 ALR 644; 75 ALJR 277 (7 December 2000).

Per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [6]:

“Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide [13]. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done [14], a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.”

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Crampton v R [2000] HCA 60

ON 23 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Crampton v R [2000] HCA 60; 206 CLR 161; 176 ALR 369; 75 ALJR 133 (23 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/60.html

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Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61

ON 23 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; 205 CLR 254; 176 ALR 411; 75 ALJR 164 (23 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/61.html

 

The High Court held that the owner/occupier of a shopping centre did not breach its duty of care to an employee of a tenant who was attacked in the unlit shopping centre car park.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“That an occupier of land owes a duty of care to a person lawfully upon the land is not in doubt. It is clear that the appellant owed the first respondent a duty in relation to the physical state and condition of the car park. The point of debate concerns whether the appellant owed a duty of a kind relevant to the harm which befell the first respondent. That was variously described in argument as a question concerning the nature, or scope, or measure of the duty. The nature of the harm suffered was physical injury inflicted by a third party over whose actions the appellant had no control. Thus, any relevant duty must have been a duty related to the security of the first respondent. It must have been a duty, as occupier of land, to take reasonable care to protect people in the position of the first respondent from conduct, including criminal conduct, of third parties.” at [17]

“The most that can be said of the present case is that the risk of harm of the kind suffered by the first respondent was foreseeable in the sense that it was real and not far-fetched. The existence of such a risk is not sufficient to impose upon an occupier of land a duty to take reasonable care to prevent harm, to somebody lawfully upon the land, from the criminal behaviour of a third party who comes onto the land. To impose such a burden upon occupiers of land, in the absence of contract or some special relationship …, would be contrary to principle; a principle which is based upon considerations of practicality and fairness. The principle cannot be negated by listing all the particular facts of the case and applying to the sum of them the question-begging characterisation that they are special. … Most of the facts said to make the case special are, upon analysis, no more than evidence that the risk of harm to the first respondent was foreseeable.” [at 35]

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Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56

ON 16 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56; 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137; 75 ALJR 1 (16 November 2000).

Jones was an adult who received serious injuries when he walked through an interior glass door at the house where he lived with his parents. The house was rented from Bartlett and another by the plaintiff’s parents.

Jones sued Bartlett for damages, alleging negligence, breach of statutory duty and breach of contract. The District Court awarded Jones damages, holding that Bartlett was negligent. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowed an appeal. Jones then appealed to the High Court, who dismissed his appeal.

The High Court found that the premises were not defective and held that there was no negligence, breach of statutory duty or breach of duty of care on the part of Bartlett.

A landlord’s duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury does not require it to make residential premises as safe as reasonable care could make them: per Gaudron J at [87]. The duty owed to the tenants concerns what a reasonable person would do in response to a foreseeable risk of injury.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“There is no ground in principle for imposing upon the respondents an obligation greater than an obligation to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to their prospective tenants and members of their household. The critical question is as to what is reasonable. The judgment of the Full Court, with which I agree, to the effect that there was no failure to take reasonable care, was a judgment of fact. It cannot be circumvented by an attempt to formulate the legal duty with greater particularity, in a manner which seeks to pre-empt the decision as to reasonableness.” at [57].

“There is no such thing as absolute safety. All residential premises contain hazards to their occupants and to visitors. Most dwelling houses could be made safer, if safety were the only consideration. The fact that a house could be made safer does not mean it is dangerous or defective. Safety standards imposed by legislation or regulation recognise a need to balance safety with other factors, including cost, convenience, aesthetics and practicality.The standards in force at the time of the lease reflect this. They did not require thicker or tougher glass to be put into the door that caused the injury unless, for some reason, the glass had to be replaced. That, it is true, is merely the way the standards were framed, and it does not pre-empt the common law. But it reflects common sense. ” at [23].

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R v Atm [2000] NSWCCA 475

ON 24 NOVEMBER 2000, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal delivered R v Atm [2000] NSWCCA 475 (24 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCCA/2000/475.html

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Carson v Legal Services Commissioner [2000] NSWCA 308

ON 3 NOVEMBER 2000, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered Carson v Legal Services Commissioner & Anor [2000] NSWCA 308 (3 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2000/308.html

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Minister for Immigration v Haji Ibrahim [2000] HCA 55

ON 26 OCTOBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Minister for Immigration v Haji Ibrahim [2000] HCA 55; 204 CLR 1; 175 ALR 585; 74 ALJR 1556 (26 October 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/55.html

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R v OGD (No 2) [2000] NSWCCA 404

ON 13 OCTOBER 2000, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal delivered R v OGD (No 2) [2000] NSWCCA 404 (13 October 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCCA/2000/404.html

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Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54

ON 12 OCTOBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54; 202 CLR 321; 175 ALR 315; 74 ALJR 1538 (12 October 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/54.html

An appellate court may not disturb a sentence just because it disagrees with the sentence imposed. Error must be identified in terms of the principles explained by the High Court in House v R.

Sentencing errors may be identified in terms of the invocation of incorrect principle; giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matter; failing to give weight to material considerations; or making a factual mistake. Sentencing errors may also be inferred from the result being manifestly unreasonable or plainly wrong.

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Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1376

Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 008 799 040) [2000] FCA 1376 (26 September 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2000/1376.html

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