ON 7 DECEMBER 1936, the High Court of Australia delivered Levy v Kum Chah [1936] HCA 60; (1936) 56 CLR 159 (7 December 1936).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/56clr159.html
Sydney, Australia
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ON 7 DECEMBER 1936, the High Court of Australia delivered Levy v Kum Chah [1936] HCA 60; (1936) 56 CLR 159 (7 December 1936).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/56clr159.html
Sydney, Australia
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ON 7 DECEMBER 1936, the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 was enacted and commenced.
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/itaa1936240
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088
ON 17 AUGUST 1936, the High Court of Australia delivered House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 (17 August 1936).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/40.html
The exercise of a judge’s discretion may be reviewed on appeal if the judge:
If there is no identifiable error, but if upon the facts the exercise of discretion is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”, an appeal court may infer that the judge has failed to properly exercise his or her discretion on the grounds that a substantial wrong has occurred.
Peter Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ:
“The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.”
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ON 12 AUGUST 1936, the High Court of Australia delivered Russell v Scott [1936] HCA 34; (1936) 55 CLR 440 (12 August 1936).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/55clr440.html
Percy Russell and his elderly aunt opened a joint bank account containing funds to be managed by Russell for the benefit of the aunt. Russell made no contributions.
After the death of the aunt, proceedings were instituted by Scott (a beneficiary under the aunt’s will) seeking a declaration that the balance of the account and some funds withdrawn before the aunt’s death belonged to the estate. The trial judge ruled that the balance of the account did not pass to Russell as the benefit was testamentary in nature and had not been made in accordance with the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW).
Russell appealed the trial judge’s decision.
The High Court found an intention by the aunt to confer upon her death, through survivorship, legal and beneficial ownership of the funds to Russell. The court therefore allowed the appeal, dismissing Scott’s action on the grounds that that the funds in question did not form part of the estate.
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088
ON 21 OCTOBER 1935, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council delivered Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1935] UKPC 2 (21 October 1935).
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1935/2.html
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088
ON THIS DAY in 1935, the United Kingdom House of Lords delivered Woolmington v DPP [1935] UKHL 1 (23 May 1935).
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1935/1.html
The case is known for the following passage:
“Through-out the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt…. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. When dealing with a murder case the Crown must prove (a) death as the result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) malice of the accused. It may prove malice either expressly or by implication. For malice may be implied where death occurs as the result of a voluntary act of the accused which is (i) intentional and (ii) unprovoked. When evidence of death and malice has been given (this is a question for the jury) the accused is entitled to show by evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced by the Crown that the act on his part which caused death was either unintentional or provoked. If the jury are either satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all the evidence, are left in reasonable doubt whether, even if his explanation be not accepted, the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted.”
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088
ON 17 OCTOBER 1934, the High Court of Australia delivered David Jones Ltd v Willis [1934] HCA 47; (1934) 52 CLR 110 (17 October 1934).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1934/47.html
Per Rich J at 118-9:
“..whenever the description of the goods enters into the transaction so that the buyer must be taken to rely upon it to a substantial degree as well as upon the identity of the goods, it is a sale by description. Therefore, if the description is a matter that influenced the buyer and had a material bearing on the decision to buy, even if it was not the only matter that influenced the buyer, then the sale is one by description.”
Goods which only have one specific use are not of merchantable quality if they are not fit for their purpose.
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ON 5 DECEMBER 1933, Prohibition on alcohol was abolished by the passing into law of the 21st amendment to the US Constitution which repealed the 18th amendment.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088
ON 18 AUGUST 1933, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant [1933] HCA 35; (1933) 50 CLR 387 (18 August 1933).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1933/35.html
Per Dixon J at 418:
‘The condition that goods are of merchantable quality requires that they should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition would buy them without abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and without special terms.”
Sydney, Australia
1300 00 2088