ON 5 DECEMBER 1973, the United Kingdom Privy Council delivered Barton v Armstrong & Ors [1976] AC 104; [1973] UKPC 2 (5 December 1973).

http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKPC/1973/2.html&query=BARTON+and+V+and+ARMSTRONG&method=boolean

A contract may be set aside on the grounds of duress if the use of illegitimate pressure was one of the causes for a party to enter into the agreement. If illegitimate pressure is established, the burden is on the person who applied such pressure to show that the pressure did not operate to cause the party to enter into the agreement.

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1973, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99 (14 September 1973).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1973/36.html

At p109-110, Gibbs J said:

“It is trite law that the primary duty of a court in construing a written contract is to endeavour to discover the intention of the parties from the words of the instrument in which the contract is embodied. Of course the whole of the instrument has to be considered, since the meaning of any one part of it may be revealed by other parts, and the words of every clause must if possible be construed so as to render them all harmonious one with another. If the words used are unambiguous the court must give effect to them, notwithstanding that the result may appear capricious or unreasonable, and notwithstanding that it may be guessed or suspected that the parties intended something different. The court has no power to remake or amend a contract for the purpose of avoiding a result which is considered to be inconvenient or unjust. On the other hand, if the language is open to two constructions, that will be preferred which will avoid consequences which appear to be capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust, “even though the construction adopted is not the most obvious, or the most grammatically accurate”, to use the words from earlier authority cited in Locke v. Dunlop (1888) 39 Ch D 387, at p 393 , which, although spoken in relation to a will, are applicable to the construction of written instruments generally; see also Bottomley’s Case (1880) 16 Ch D 681, at p 686 . Further, it will be permissible to depart from the ordinary meaning of the words of one provision so far as is necessary to avoid an inconsistency between that provision and the rest of the instrument. Finally, the statement of Lord Wright in Hillas & Co. Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd. [1932] UKHL 2; (1932) 147 LT 503, at p 514 , that the court should construe commercial contracts “fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in finding defects”, should not, in my opinion, be understood as limited to documents drawn by businessmen for themselves and without legal assistance (cf. Upper Hunter County District Council v. Australian Chilling and Freezing Co. Ltd. [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429, at p 437 ).”