Category Archives: Personal Injury

Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority [1993] HCA 76 | 21 April 1993

ON 21 APRIL 1993, the High Court of Australia delivered Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority [1993] HCA 76; 177 CLR 423; (1993) Aust Torts Reporter 81-211; (1993) 112 ALR 393; (1993) 67 ALJR 426 (21 April 1993).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1993/76.html

Nagle became a quadriplegic after diving into a swimming hole and striking his head on a submerged rock.  It was known to Rottnest that visitors engaged in this activity.

Rottnest was liable to pay Nagle damages as it had breached its duty of care to Nagle to warn him of the risk of submerged rocks.

The risk was foreseeable: “Whether small or not, the risk was certainly not far-fetched or fanciful.”

The accident was cased by a failure on the part of Rottnest to erect a sign.

The Civil Liability Acts have since altered the obligations and responsibilities of public authorities and occupiers in such situations.

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Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang [2007] HCA 15

ON THIS DAY in 2007, the High Court of Australia delivered Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang [2007] HCA 15; (2007) 234 ALR 131; 81 ALJR 919 (19 April 2007).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/15.html

When assessing damages, life expectancy is to be calculated with reference to the ABS projected tables (as opposed to historical tables).

Statutory payments for treatment and rehabilitation expenses are to be deducted after making an apportionment for contributory negligence.

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Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9 | 7 April 2011

ON THIS DAY in 2011, the High Court of Australia delivered Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9 (7 April 2011).

A joint illegal enterprise (eg joyride) negates a duty of care (driver to passenger) thereby creating a defence of illegality on the part of the driver/insurer: see Gala v Preston [1991] HCA 18. However, in Miller v Miller the High Court held that the plaintiff (injured passenger) was owed a duty of care because she withdrew from the enterprise by asking to be let out of the car and there were no reasonable steps available to her to prevent the continuation of the offence.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2011/9.html

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Harvey & 1 Ors v PD [2004] NSWCA 97 | 30 March 2004

ON THIS DAY IN 2004, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered Harvey & 1 Ors v PD [2004] NSWCA 97. A doctor performing STD tests upon a couple has a duty before the tests are performed to obtain the couple’s consent to share the results.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2004/97.html

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Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7 | 10 March 1987

NEGLIGENCE. OCCUPIER’S LIABILITY. INJURY. ON THIS DAY IN 1987, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7; (1987) 162 CLR 479 (10 March 1987).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1987/7.html

An occupier of premises owes a duty of care under the ordinary principles of negligence to take reasonable care for the safety of a person who enters the premises, irrespective of whether they are an invitee, trespasser or licensee.

Per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 488:

“We think it is wholly consistent with the trend of recent decisions of this Court touching the law of negligence, both in this area of an occupier’s liability towards entrants on his land and in the areas which were the subject of consideration in San Sebastian Pty. Ltd. v. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 [1986] HCA 68; (1986) 68 ALR 161 and Cook v. Cook [1986] HCA 73; (1986) 61 ALJR 25; 68 ALR 353, to simplify the operation of the law to accord with the statement of Deane J. in Hackshaw, at pp.662-663:

‘… it is not necessary, in an action in
negligence against an occupier, to go through the
procedure of considering whether either one or
other or both of a special duty qua occupier and an
ordinary duty of care was owed. All that is
necessary is to determine whether, in all the
relevant circumstances including the fact of the
defendant’s occupation of premises and the manner
of the plaintiff’s entry upon them, the defendant
owed a duty of care under the ordinary principles
of negligence to the plaintiff. A prerequisite of
any such duty is that there be the necessary degree
of proximity of relationship. The touchstone of
its existence is that there be reasonable
foreseeability of a real risk of injury to the
visitor or to the class of person of which the
visitor is a member. The measure of the discharge
of the duty is what a reasonable man would, in the
circumstances, do by way of response to the
foreseeable risk.'”

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Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5 | 16 February 1995

ON THIS DAY IN 1995, the High Court of Australia delivered Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1; (1995) 127 ALR 180 (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322 (16 February 1995).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/5.html

Per Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said at [6]:

“For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question whether the requisite causal connexion exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is essentially one of fact to be resolved, on the probabilities, as a matter of commonsense and experience. And that remains so in a case such as the present where the question of the existence of the requisite causal connexion is complicated by the intervention of some act or decision of the plaintiff …which constitutes a more immediate cause of the loss or damage. … If, in such a case, it can be seen that the necessary causal connexion would exist if the intervening act or decision be disregarded, the question of causation may often be conveniently expressed in terms of whether the intrusion of that act or decision has had the effect of breaking the chain of causation which would otherwise have existed between the breach of duty and the particular loss or damage. The ultimate question must, however, always be whether, notwithstanding the intervention of the subsequent decision, the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is, as between the plaintiff and the defendant and as a matter of commonsense and experience, properly to be seen as having caused the relevant loss or damage. Indeed, in some cases, it may be potentially misleading to pose the question of causation in terms of whether an intervening act or decision has interrupted or broken a chain of causation which would otherwise have existed. An example of such a case is where the negligent act or omission was itself a direct or indirect contributing cause of the intervening act or decision.”

Per McHugh J at [20]:

“However, the ultimate question is whether, as a matter of common sense, the financial loss that the plaintiff has suffered was caused by the plaintiff’s act in resigning his office rather than by the defendant’s negligence.”

Per McHugh J at [23]:

“The plaintiff’s complaints of pain and fatigue, his decreasing confidence in his own abilities, his belief that he was no longer teaching as well as he was before the accident and his inability to find time for research combine to make a strong case for concluding that his early retirement was not unreasonable. A defendant cannot reasonably require a plaintiff to remain in employment for the purpose of reducing the damages that the defendant would otherwise have to pay if to do so would interfere with the plaintiff’s reasonable enjoyment of life. The doctrine of mitigation of loss was not intended to turn injured plaintiffs into economic slaves.”

 

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Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1 | 13 February 1986

ON THIS DAY IN 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html

Per Mason J at 24:

“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the
importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):

“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”

But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of
a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of
remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”

Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:

“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”

Per Brennan J:

“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”

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British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2 | 9 February 2011

ON 9 FEBRUARY 2011, the High Court of Australia delivered British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2 (9 February 2011).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2011/2.html

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Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3 | 23 January 1998

ON 23 January 1998, the High Court of Australia delivered Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3; 192 CLR 330; 151 ALR 147; 72 ALJR 152 (23 January 1998).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/3.html

The High Court rejected the “doctrine of general reliance” of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 (1985) 157 CLR 424.

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Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72 | 16 December 1981

ON 16 DECEMBER 1981, the High Court of Australia delivered Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402 (16 December 1981).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1981/72.html

The High Court ruled that a discount rate be applied to the assessment of lump sum damages for personal injuries so that the present value of future economic loss be discounted by 3% to allow for inflation, tax and changes in wages.

Subsequent legislation has increased the rate to 5% in most Australian jurisdictions.

 

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