Category Archives: Personal Injury

Dust Diseases Tribunal

ON 21 JULY 1989, the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal (DDT) http://www.dustdiseasestribunal.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ was established through the enactment of the Dust Diseases Act 1989 http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/viewtop/inforce/act+63+1989+FIRST+0+N/.

The DDT is a specialist tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to determine damages claims for death or injury arising from dust-exposure related diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma. The tribunal’s special purpose is to serve the interests of justice by expediting claims in circumstances where the claimants are in the advanced stages of illness.

The first judge to hear a case in the tribunal was Judge J L O’Meally AM RFD a tribunal Member (1989 to 1995), Senior Member (1995 to 1998) and President (1998 to 2011).

The Tribunal’s current judges are:

  • President Justice R O Blanch AM
  • Judge J P Curtis
  • Judge W P Kearns SC
  • Judge Finnane RFD QC
  • Acting Judge P J Johns

The court is situated at 12th Floor, John Maddison Tower, 88 Goulburn Street, Sydney NSW 2000. For all enquiries call (02) 9377 5440.

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7

NEGLIGENCE. OCCUPIER’S LIABILITY. INJURY. ON 10 MARCH 1987, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7; (1987) 162 CLR 479 (10 March 1987).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1987/7.html

An occupier of premises owes a duty of care under the ordinary principles of negligence to take reasonable care for the safety of a person who enters the premises, irrespective of whether they are an invitee, trespasser or licensee.

Per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 488:

“We think it is wholly consistent with the trend of recent decisions of this Court touching the law of negligence, both in this area of an occupier’s liability towards entrants on his land and in the areas which were the subject of consideration in San Sebastian Pty. Ltd. v. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 [1986] HCA 68; (1986) 68 ALR 161 and Cook v. Cook [1986] HCA 73; (1986) 61 ALJR 25; 68 ALR 353, to simplify the operation of the law to accord with the statement of Deane J. in Hackshaw, at pp.662-663:

‘… it is not necessary, in an action in
negligence against an occupier, to go through the
procedure of considering whether either one or
other or both of a special duty qua occupier and an
ordinary duty of care was owed. All that is
necessary is to determine whether, in all the
relevant circumstances including the fact of the
defendant’s occupation of premises and the manner
of the plaintiff’s entry upon them, the defendant
owed a duty of care under the ordinary principles
of negligence to the plaintiff. A prerequisite of
any such duty is that there be the necessary degree
of proximity of relationship. The touchstone of
its existence is that there be reasonable
foreseeability of a real risk of injury to the
visitor or to the class of person of which the
visitor is a member. The measure of the discharge
of the duty is what a reasonable man would, in the
circumstances, do by way of response to the
foreseeable risk.'”

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20

ON 13 MAY 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301 (13 May 1986).

Braistina was a metal trades worker employed by Bankstown Foundry. As part of his duties he drilled holes in cast iron pipes weighing about 60 pounds. He was required to lift about 40 pipes an hour from a pallet onto a drilling machine and then onto another pallet after the drilling.

On a particular shift, Braistina injured his neck after drilling about 115 pipes over a three hour period. Medical evidence showed that the lifting and twisting made the risk of injury foreseeable and not far fetched and fanciful.

A hoist was readily available but not used. The use of the hoist was not impracticable, caused no undue expense or nor any difficulty. Had the hoist been used the risk of injury would have been eliminated.

The court held that in the circumstances, a prudent employer would reasonably require that the hoist be used.

An employer must take reasonable steps to enforce a safe system of work, otherwise they are in breach of their duty of care to the employee and will be found negligent and liable for the injury, loss and damage suffered by the employee.

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1

ON 13 FEBRUARY 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html

Per Mason J at 24:

“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):

“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”

But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”

Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:

“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”

Per Brennan J:

“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 37

ON 11 JUNE 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 37; (1985) 156 CLR 522 (11 June 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/37.html

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34; 59 ALJR 492; 59 ALR 529 (29 May 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/34.html

“The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, i.e. of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (Pennington v. Norris [1956] HCA 26; (1956) 96 CLR 10, at p 16) and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage: Stapley v. Gypsum Mines Ltd. [1953] UKHL 4; (1953) AC 663, at p 682; Smith v. McIntyre [1958] TASStRp 11; (1958) Tas.SR 36, at pp 42-49 and Broadhurst v. Millman [1976] VicRp 15; (1976) VR 208, at p 219 and cases there cited. It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination. The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case; for example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance.”

Lawyers

1300 00 2088

Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72

ON 16 DECEMBER 1981, the High Court of Australia delivered Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402 (16 December 1981).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1981/72.html

The High Court ruled that a discount rate be applied to the assessment of lump sum damages for personal injuries so that the present value of future economic loss be discounted by 3% to allow for inflation, tax and changes in wages.

Subsequent legislation has increased the rate to 5% in most Australian jurisdictions.

Lawyers

1300 00 2088

Dente v Riddell Inc [1981] USCA1 249

Dente v Riddell Inc [1981] USCA1 249; 664 F.2d 1; 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 599 (25 September 1981).

http://www.worldlii.org/us/cases/federal/USCA1/1981/249.html

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088

Cullen v Trappell [1980] HCA 10

ON 1 MAY 1980, the High Court of Australia delivered Cullen v Trappell [1980] HCA 10; (1980) 146 CLR 1 (1 May 1980).

“Damages – Negligence – Personal injuries – Effect of taxation liability on quantum of damages – Whether damages should be reduced by tax plaintiff would have paid in respect of earnings if he had not been injured – Gourley principle.
Practice (N.S.W.) – Judgment – Interest – Damages for personal injuries – Damages for economic loss up to date of judgment – Damages for other than economic loss – Discretion – Supreme Court Act, 1970 (N.S.W.), s. 94 (1).”

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1980/10.html

The court overruled the earlier High Court decision of Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202 and affirmed the rule in British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185.

Damages are to compensate the plaintiff for the loss suffered, no more or no less. If the damages are taxable income, allowance should be made for this by an award of the gross sum.  If the damages are not taxable, the award should be reduced by any tax the plaintiff would have been required to pay. If the plaintiff is entitled to a tax deduction as a result of the loss, an allowance should be made in the award.

In a claim for personal injuries damages, a court must assess the plaintiff’s pre-injury earning capacity with regards to their net income after tax.  An assessment involving gross income would result in over-compensation.

Interest on past continuing losses is not to be paid at the full rate for the whole period as this would lead to over-compensation. Instead, interest is to be paid at half the rate over the full period or at the full rate over half the period so as to take into account the gradual way in which interest accrues. The awarding of interest is a discretionary matter that must be approached in a “broad and practical way”.

Lawyers

1300 00 2088

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12

ON THIS DAY in 1980, the High Court of Australia delivered Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 (1 May 1980).

“Negligence – Duty of care – Breach of duty – Foreseeability of risk of injury – Likelihood of harm occurring – Erection of sign “deep water” in vicinity of shallow water – Whether foreseeable that inexperienced water-skier would fall and suffer injury.”

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1980/12.html

Mason J at p48 expressed the “risk calculus”, that when deciding on a breach of duty of care, the court must not only determine a foreseeable risk but it must also determine a reasonable man’s response by “consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have”.

Lawyers

Sydney, Australia

1300 00 2088