Category Archives: Negligence

Gala v Preston [1991] HCA 18

ON 28 MAY 1991, the High Court of Australia delivered Gala v Preston [1991] HCA 18; (1991) 172 CLR 243 (28 May 1991).

A passenger injured whilst travelling in a car that was used for an unlawful purpose was not entitled to damages for injuries he received when the driver lost control of the vehicle and collided with a tree. The court held that a duty not was owed because there was no relationship of proximity between the parties and in the circumstances the they could not have had “any reasonable basis for expecting that a driver of the vehicle would drive it according to ordinary standards of competence and care”.

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March v Stramare (E & M H) Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12

ON 24 APRIL 1991, the High Court of Australia delivered March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506; (1991) 9 BCL 215 (24 April 1991).

Negligence – Causation – Duty of care – Injury reasonably foreseeable – Successive negligent acts by different persons – Whether first negligent actor exonerated by intervening negligent act – Apportionment of liability – Wrongs Act 1936 (S.A.), s. 27a(3).

The “but for” test was considered to be not a definitive test of causation in negligence.  Causation is a question of fact to be determined with reference to common sense and experience.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/12.html

The “but for” test has since been revived by the operation of the Civil Liability Acts: see for instance Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Bou Najem [2009] HCA 48 (10 November 2009).

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Hawkins v Clayton [1988] HCA 15

ON 8 APRIL 1988, the High Court of Australia delivered Hawkins v Clayton [1988] HCA 15; (1988) 164 CLR 539 (8 April 1988).

A firm of solicitors was held to be negligent by failing to take reasonable steps to locate an executor (a non-client) following the death of a testatrix (a client whose will they prepared and retained for safe keeping) for some six years after the testatrix’s death.  The solicitors were held to be liable to pay damages for the loss suffered by the executor (who was also a residuary beneficiary) in not being able to manage the estate during the period of delay.

The majority (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ) held that the solicitors owed a tortious duty of care to the executor and that the action was not statute-barred.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/15.html

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Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7

NEGLIGENCE. OCCUPIER’S LIABILITY. INJURY. ON 10 MARCH 1987, the High Court of Australia delivered Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna [1987] HCA 7; (1987) 162 CLR 479 (10 March 1987).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1987/7.html

An occupier of premises owes a duty of care under the ordinary principles of negligence to take reasonable care for the safety of a person who enters the premises, irrespective of whether they are an invitee, trespasser or licensee.

Per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 488:

“We think it is wholly consistent with the trend of recent decisions of this Court touching the law of negligence, both in this area of an occupier’s liability towards entrants on his land and in the areas which were the subject of consideration in San Sebastian Pty. Ltd. v. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 [1986] HCA 68; (1986) 68 ALR 161 and Cook v. Cook [1986] HCA 73; (1986) 61 ALJR 25; 68 ALR 353, to simplify the operation of the law to accord with the statement of Deane J. in Hackshaw, at pp.662-663:

‘… it is not necessary, in an action in
negligence against an occupier, to go through the
procedure of considering whether either one or
other or both of a special duty qua occupier and an
ordinary duty of care was owed. All that is
necessary is to determine whether, in all the
relevant circumstances including the fact of the
defendant’s occupation of premises and the manner
of the plaintiff’s entry upon them, the defendant
owed a duty of care under the ordinary principles
of negligence to the plaintiff. A prerequisite of
any such duty is that there be the necessary degree
of proximity of relationship. The touchstone of
its existence is that there be reasonable
foreseeability of a real risk of injury to the
visitor or to the class of person of which the
visitor is a member. The measure of the discharge
of the duty is what a reasonable man would, in the
circumstances, do by way of response to the
foreseeable risk.'”

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Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20

ON 13 MAY 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301 (13 May 1986).

Braistina was a metal trades worker employed by Bankstown Foundry. As part of his duties he drilled holes in cast iron pipes weighing about 60 pounds. He was required to lift about 40 pipes an hour from a pallet onto a drilling machine and then onto another pallet after the drilling.

On a particular shift, Braistina injured his neck after drilling about 115 pipes over a three hour period. Medical evidence showed that the lifting and twisting made the risk of injury foreseeable and not far fetched and fanciful.

A hoist was readily available but not used. The use of the hoist was not impracticable, caused no undue expense or nor any difficulty. Had the hoist been used the risk of injury would have been eliminated.

The court held that in the circumstances, a prudent employer would reasonably require that the hoist be used.

An employer must take reasonable steps to enforce a safe system of work, otherwise they are in breach of their duty of care to the employee and will be found negligent and liable for the injury, loss and damage suffered by the employee.

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Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1

ON 13 FEBRUARY 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html

Per Mason J at 24:

“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):

“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”

But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”

Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:

“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”

Per Brennan J:

“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”

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Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman [1985] HCA 41

ON 4 JULY 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 157 CLR 424 (4 July 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/41.html

The council was sued by a resident homeowner for the expenses associated with remedying damage caused to their house due to it being constructed on inadequate footings. The owner alleged that the council was negligent in that it failed in it’s duty of care to ensure that the dwelling was properly constructed in accordance with the plans they approved because it failed to inspect the foundations before they were covered up.

The court did not find the council to be negligent in this case. Nevertheless, the decision established the principle that a public authority is governed by the ordinary principles of the law of negligence, even if it is a repository of a statutory discretion.

The court held that in certain circumstances a government body could be negligent in failing to prevent harm where a reasonable reliance arises from the community’s dependence on the function being exercised with due care.

Per Mason J at 464:

“…there will be cases in which the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance will arise out of a general dependence on an authority’s performance of its function with due care, without the need for contributing conduct on the part of a defendant or action to his detriment on the part of a plaintiff. …The control of air traffic, the safety inspection of aircraft and the fighting of a fire…by a fire authority…may well be examples of this type of function. …Whether the inspection of motor vehicles for registration purposes could generate such a general reliance is a more complex question…”

Per Mason J at 469:

“The distinction between policy and operational factors is not easy to formulate, but the dividing line between them will be observed if we recognize that a public authority is under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints. Thus budgetary allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms of allocation of resources cannot be made the subject of a duty of care. But it may be otherwise when the courts are called upon to apply a standard of care to action or inaction that is merely the product of administrative direction, expert or professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness.”

The “doctrine of general reliance” has since been rejected by the High Court: see Pyrenees Shire Council v Day; Eskimo Amber Pty Ltd v Pyrenees Shire Council (1998) 192 CLR 330.

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Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 37

ON 11 JUNE 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 37; (1985) 156 CLR 522 (11 June 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/37.html

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Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34; 59 ALJR 492; 59 ALR 529 (29 May 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/34.html

“The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, i.e. of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (Pennington v. Norris [1956] HCA 26; (1956) 96 CLR 10, at p 16) and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage: Stapley v. Gypsum Mines Ltd. [1953] UKHL 4; (1953) AC 663, at p 682; Smith v. McIntyre [1958] TASStRp 11; (1958) Tas.SR 36, at pp 42-49 and Broadhurst v. Millman [1976] VicRp 15; (1976) VR 208, at p 219 and cases there cited. It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination. The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case; for example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance.”

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Hackshaw v Shaw [1984] HCA 84

ON 11 DECEBER 1984, the High Court of Australia delivered Hackshaw v Shaw [1984] HCA 84; (1984) 155 CLR 614 (11 December 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/84.html

An occupier of land owes a duty of care to a trespasser if it is foreseeable that the trespasser could be injured by the occupier’s negligence.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/poteoa1997455

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