Category Archives: LAW FIRM

Re Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice [1986] FCA 90

ON 27 MARCH 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Re Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice [1986] FCA 90 (27 March 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1986/90.html

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1986 | Australia Act

ON THIS DAY in 1986, the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) commenced.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aa1986114

Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1986] HCA 3

Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1986] HCA 3; (1986) 160 CLR 1 (20 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/160clr1.html

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Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1

ON 13 FEBRUARY 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html

Per Mason J at 24:

“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):

“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”

But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”

Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:

“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”

Per Brennan J:

“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”

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Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81

ON 18 DECEMBER 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 (18 December 1985).

 

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/81.html

The High Court recognized that an administrative decision maker has duty of acting fairly or according procedural fairness under the rules of natural justice. 

A decision was made to deport Mr Kioa and his family back to Tonga on the grounds of him changing his address without notifying the department and engaging with Tongan illegal immigrants. Mr Kioa was given an opportunity to make submissions but was not informed of the adverse allegations.

The High Court held that a failure to disclose to Mr Kioa the adverse allegations and allow him the opportunity to respond was a failure to afford procedural fairness.

As a fundamental principle of natural justice, an opportunity must be given to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made.

Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78

Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583 (6 December 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/160clr583.html

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Yorke v Lucas

Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65; (1985) 158 CLR 661 (3 October 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/158clr661.html

The court said that although an intention to mislead or deceive is not a requisite element for a contravention of s52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, the passing on of false information by a corporation is not misleading or deceptive conduct if it is apparent that the corporation is not the source of the information and it disclaims any belief in its truth or falsity.

To be liable for misleading or deceptive conduct, the individual passing on the information must either be an intentional participant, or if not, a participant with knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention of s52 (even if he or she does not know that those matters amount to a contravention).


Peter O’Grady, Lawyer
General Counsel, legal helpdesk mosman
BA, LLB, Grad Cert Leg Prac, Acc Spec
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of NSW, Federal Court of Australia and High Court of Australia

Capital Gains Tax

20 SEPTEMBER 1985 is a pivotal date for the assessment of Capital Gains Tax under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).

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He Kaw Teh v R [1985] HCA 43

ON 11 JULY 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered He Kaw Teh v R [1985] HCA 43; (1985) 157 CLR 523 (11 July 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/43.html

Even if a statute does not indicate that intent is an element of a grave criminal offence, it is to be presumed that intent is an element to be proved by the prosecution. In cases of possession, knowledge of the goods being in the accused’s custody is a necessary element and therefore knowledge must be proved by the prosecution.

In this case, the accused claimed that he did not know that he was in possession of heroin and therefore did not knowingly bring it into the country in contravention of the Customs Act.

Finding that the provision required proof of knowledge and intent, the court allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to determine the questions of knowledge and intent in accordance with the High Court’s judgment.

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Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman [1985] HCA 41

ON 4 JULY 1985, the High Court of Australia delivered Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 157 CLR 424 (4 July 1985).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/41.html

The council was sued by a resident homeowner for the expenses associated with remedying damage caused to their house due to it being constructed on inadequate footings. The owner alleged that the council was negligent in that it failed in it’s duty of care to ensure that the dwelling was properly constructed in accordance with the plans they approved because it failed to inspect the foundations before they were covered up.

The court did not find the council to be negligent in this case. Nevertheless, the decision established the principle that a public authority is governed by the ordinary principles of the law of negligence, even if it is a repository of a statutory discretion.

The court held that in certain circumstances a government body could be negligent in failing to prevent harm where a reasonable reliance arises from the community’s dependence on the function being exercised with due care.

Per Mason J at 464:

“…there will be cases in which the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance will arise out of a general dependence on an authority’s performance of its function with due care, without the need for contributing conduct on the part of a defendant or action to his detriment on the part of a plaintiff. …The control of air traffic, the safety inspection of aircraft and the fighting of a fire…by a fire authority…may well be examples of this type of function. …Whether the inspection of motor vehicles for registration purposes could generate such a general reliance is a more complex question…”

Per Mason J at 469:

“The distinction between policy and operational factors is not easy to formulate, but the dividing line between them will be observed if we recognize that a public authority is under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints. Thus budgetary allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms of allocation of resources cannot be made the subject of a duty of care. But it may be otherwise when the courts are called upon to apply a standard of care to action or inaction that is merely the product of administrative direction, expert or professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness.”

The “doctrine of general reliance” has since been rejected by the High Court: see Pyrenees Shire Council v Day; Eskimo Amber Pty Ltd v Pyrenees Shire Council (1998) 192 CLR 330.

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