Category Archives: Duty of Care

Compensation to relatives, Duty of Care, LAW FIRM, Negligence, Personal Injury

Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra [2009] HCA 15

Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra [2009] HCA 15 (22 April 2009).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2009/15.html

“TORTS – Negligence – Duty of care – Where Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic), s 10 empowered police to apprehend person who “appears to be mentally ill” if reasonable grounds for believing that person had recently attempted suicide or likely to do so – Where police came upon man who appeared to have been contemplating suicide but showed no sign of mental illness – Interaction of common law and relationship established by s 10 – Whether duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm to man at own hand – Relevance of conditions engaging exercise of statutory power – Relevance of fact that duty alleged is duty to protect person from self-harm – Relevance of general rule against duty to rescue – Relevance of vulnerability of particular class of persons – Relevance of control over source of risk to persons.

TORTS – Negligence – Duty of care – Where duty alleged to arise in context of power conferred by Mental Health Act 1986, s 10 – Whether preconditions to existence of power established on facts – Whether common law duty could exist in absence of relevant power.

TORTS – Breach of statutory duty – Relevance as alternative to action alleging breach of common law duty of care – Principles relevant to determining legislative intention that cause of action be available – Relevance of legislative provision for special measures to protect identifiable class of persons or property – Whether existence of discretion to exercise power inconsistent with existence of statutory duty.

STATUTES – Interpretation – Whether person who has attempted suicide to be equated with person “mentally ill” – Relationship between attempted suicide and mental illness – Understanding at common law of relationship between suicide and mental illness.

WORDS AND PRRASES – “mentally ill”.

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 457, 463B.
Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic), ss 3, 8, 10.
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt III.”

The court decided that two police officers did not owe a duty of care to a man who took his life; nor to his surviving spouse. Earlier in the day of the deceased’s death the officers had observed an apparent suicide attempt by the deceased but were satisfied that he sounded rational and was responsive to their questions.

The law does not create an obligation to rescue another from harm and in this case there were no special features outside of the general rule.

As the police officers had not formed the view that the deceased was mentally ill, they had no power to apprehend him and have him assessed under the Mental Health Act.

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Imbree v McNeilly [2008] HCA 40

ON 28 AUGUST 2008, the High Court of Australia delivered Imbree v McNeilly [2008] HCA 40 (28 August 2008).

The High Court held that an unlicensed 16 year old driver owed the same duty of care as any other driver to take reasonable care to avoid injury to others, overturning its decision in Cook v Cook [1986] HCA 73; (1986) 162 CLR 376 (2 December 1986) in which it had held that the standard of care was that which would be expected of an unqualified and inexperience driver.

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QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Smith [2005] NSWCA 130

ON 26 APRIL 2005, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Smith by his next friend Avard & Anor [2005] NSWCA 130 (26 April 2005).

The plaintiff was a nine year old boy who had been travelling as a passenger in a truck driven by his father.  They had been crabbing on a boat borrowed from a friend and were towing the boat back to it’s owner.  The plaintiff’s father stopped the truck across the road from the boat owner’s premises and directed the plaintiff to cross the road and open the gate. The plaintiff was injured when he was struck by another vehicle whilst crossing the road.

The father was held to be at fault in pausing and arranging for the gate to be opened and this was compensable under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 as it occurred in the use or operation of a motor vehicle.

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NSW v Lepore [2003] HCA 4

ON THIS DAY in 2003, the High Court of Australia delivered New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4; 212 CLR 511; 195 ALR 412; 77 ALJR 558 (6 February 2003).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2003/4.html

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Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35

ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2002, the High Court of Australia delivered Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35; 211 CLR 317; 191 ALR 449; 76 ALJR 1348 (5 September 2002).

In a claim for damages for psychiatric injury caused by negligence, direct perception of the event or its aftermath is not a necessary aspect in all cases.

The question is whether it was reasonable to require the defendant to contemplate the risk of psychiatric injury to the plaintiff, and to take reasonable care to guard against the risk.

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Civil procedure, Duty of Care, LAW FIRM, Legislation, Medical negligence, Negligence, Nuisance, Occupiers Liability, Personal Injury, Product liability, Professional negligence, Torts

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

ON 18 JUNE 2002, the NSW Civil Liability Act 2002 was enacted.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cla2002161/

The substantive provisions commenced retrospectively on 20 March 2002. There have been successive amendments, notably those which commenced in December 2002 and 2004 and June 2006.

The Act modifies the Australian common law with respect to civil liability claims in New South Wales, except those set out in s3B.

The Act limits the circumstances in which people may recover damages for civil wrongs and the amount of damages and costs they recover.

The significant features of the Act include:

  • Statement of principles for determining negligence.
  • Modification of causation test.
  • No duty to warn of obvious risk.
  • No liability for materialisation of inherent risk.
  • No liability for harm suffered from obvious risks of dangerous recreational activities.
  • No duty of care for risk warning of dangerous recreational activity.
  • Standard of care for professionals.
  • Contributory negligence can defeat a claim.
  • Fixing damages for economic and non-economic loss, including thresholds, discounts and maximum limits.
  • Limiting interest.
  • Restrictions for persons in custody.
  • Restrictions for mental harm.
  • Allocation of proportionate liability for concurrent wrongdoers.
  • Limiting liability of public authorities.
  • Restricting recovery for intoxicated persons.
  • Exclusion of liability for persons acting in self defence, good Samaritans, food donors or volunteers.
  • Apologies not to affect liability.
  • Limiting damages for birth of a child.
  • Exclusion of liability for trespass or nuisance by ordinary use of aircraft.
  • Costs restrictions.

The Act does not apply to claims (or parts of claims) regarding:

  • Intentional acts with the intent to cause injury or death or sexual assault or other sexual misconduct.
  • Dust diseases.
  • Tobacco.
  • Motor Accidents and public transport accidents.
  • Workers, Victims and Sporting Injuries compensation.

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Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29

ON 31 MAY 2001, the High Court of Australia delivered Brodie v Singleton Shire Council ; Ghantous v Hawkesbury City Council[2001] HCA 29; (2001) 206 CLR 512.

The ruling abolished the common law immunity of highway authorities from liability for injury, loss or damage caused by their own non-feasance in Australia.

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Sharp v Stephen Guinery t/as Port Kembla Hotel and Port Kembla Rsl Club [2001] NSWSC 336

ON 23 APRIL 2001, Justice Peter McClellan of the Supreme Court of NSW delivered Sharp v Stephen Guinery t/as Port Kembla Hotel and Port Kembla Rsl Club [2001] NSWSC 336 (23 April 2001).

“Judgment on application for verdict by direction

negligence action

whether plaintiff precluded from putting a case in negligence to jury

whether evidence of breach of duty

whether evidence which could establish that the taking of any step would have eliminated risk of plaintiff’s injury

whether evidence before the jury that the risk of injury from tobacco smoke was reasonably foreseeable

whether rule in Browne v Dunn has application

s 23(4), s 42(1) Factories, Shops & Industries Act 1962”

Sharp had sought damages from her employer alleging that her exposure to tobacco smoke as a barmaid resulted in her suffering from laryngeal cancer.  The case was heard before a jury.

The judgment led to jury directions which resulted in a finding that the cancer was caused, or materially contributed to, by the employer’s negligence.

On 2 May 2001, the jury awarded Sharp damages of $466,000 plus costs.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2001/336.html

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Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61

ON 23 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; 205 CLR 254; 176 ALR 411; 75 ALJR 164 (23 November 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/61.html

 

The High Court held that the owner/occupier of a shopping centre did not breach its duty of care to an employee of a tenant who was attacked in the unlit shopping centre car park.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“That an occupier of land owes a duty of care to a person lawfully upon the land is not in doubt. It is clear that the appellant owed the first respondent a duty in relation to the physical state and condition of the car park. The point of debate concerns whether the appellant owed a duty of a kind relevant to the harm which befell the first respondent. That was variously described in argument as a question concerning the nature, or scope, or measure of the duty. The nature of the harm suffered was physical injury inflicted by a third party over whose actions the appellant had no control. Thus, any relevant duty must have been a duty related to the security of the first respondent. It must have been a duty, as occupier of land, to take reasonable care to protect people in the position of the first respondent from conduct, including criminal conduct, of third parties.” at [17]

“The most that can be said of the present case is that the risk of harm of the kind suffered by the first respondent was foreseeable in the sense that it was real and not far-fetched. The existence of such a risk is not sufficient to impose upon an occupier of land a duty to take reasonable care to prevent harm, to somebody lawfully upon the land, from the criminal behaviour of a third party who comes onto the land. To impose such a burden upon occupiers of land, in the absence of contract or some special relationship …, would be contrary to principle; a principle which is based upon considerations of practicality and fairness. The principle cannot be negated by listing all the particular facts of the case and applying to the sum of them the question-begging characterisation that they are special. … Most of the facts said to make the case special are, upon analysis, no more than evidence that the risk of harm to the first respondent was foreseeable.” [at 35]

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Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56

ON 16 NOVEMBER 2000, the High Court of Australia delivered Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56; 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137; 75 ALJR 1 (16 November 2000).

Jones was an adult who received serious injuries when he walked through an interior glass door at the house where he lived with his parents. The house was rented from Bartlett and another by the plaintiff’s parents.

Jones sued Bartlett for damages, alleging negligence, breach of statutory duty and breach of contract. The District Court awarded Jones damages, holding that Bartlett was negligent. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowed an appeal. Jones then appealed to the High Court, who dismissed his appeal.

The High Court found that the premises were not defective and held that there was no negligence, breach of statutory duty or breach of duty of care on the part of Bartlett.

A landlord’s duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury does not require it to make residential premises as safe as reasonable care could make them: per Gaudron J at [87]. The duty owed to the tenants concerns what a reasonable person would do in response to a foreseeable risk of injury.

Per Gleeson CJ:

“There is no ground in principle for imposing upon the respondents an obligation greater than an obligation to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to their prospective tenants and members of their household. The critical question is as to what is reasonable. The judgment of the Full Court, with which I agree, to the effect that there was no failure to take reasonable care, was a judgment of fact. It cannot be circumvented by an attempt to formulate the legal duty with greater particularity, in a manner which seeks to pre-empt the decision as to reasonableness.” at [57].

“There is no such thing as absolute safety. All residential premises contain hazards to their occupants and to visitors. Most dwelling houses could be made safer, if safety were the only consideration. The fact that a house could be made safer does not mean it is dangerous or defective. Safety standards imposed by legislation or regulation recognise a need to balance safety with other factors, including cost, convenience, aesthetics and practicality.The standards in force at the time of the lease reflect this. They did not require thicker or tougher glass to be put into the door that caused the injury unless, for some reason, the glass had to be replaced. That, it is true, is merely the way the standards were framed, and it does not pre-empt the common law. But it reflects common sense. ” at [23].

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