Numbers of adults and juveniles in custody fell significantly over the period from April to June. Adults dropped by 27% and juveniles dropped 16%.
The drop is said to be attributable to a fall in the number of defendants being held in remand, which coincides with the introduction of the new Bail Act 2013 (NSW).
ON 24 JULY 1997, the High Court of Australia delivered Postiglione v R [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295; (1997) 145 ALR 408; (1997) 71 ALJR 875 (24 July 1997).
The decision is an exposition of the principle of due proportionality set out in the earlier decision of the court in Lowe v R [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606 (2 August 1984).
Different sentences may be imposed upon like offenders to reflect different degrees of culpability or different circumstances of the offenders.
At 302, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said:
“Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality.”
The accused interrupted a game of tennis during the 1971 Wimbledon tournament. He entered the court, blew a whistle and distributed leaflets protesting against South African apartheid. Several others carrying banners and placards also entered the court. The accused was forcibly removed. The incident lasted two or three minutes.
The accused was charged with using insulting behaviour where a breach of the peace was likely to occur. At first instance, the Magistrate dismissed the charge, finding that the behaviour was not insulting. On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the conduct could be insulting as a matter of law and remitted the matter back to the Magistrate. The accused then appealed to the House of Lords.
This decision sets out a procedural rule concerning the prosecution’s burden and onus of proof in criminal proceedings. There are two limbs.
The first limb: At the close of the prosecution case, the defendant may make a submission, without calling evidence, that there is “there is no case to answer”. The question to be determined is whether or not the defendant ought to be lawfully convicted.
The second limb: The question to be determined, as a question of fact, is whether or not on the whole of the evidence before it the court is satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even if a statute does not indicate that intent is an element of a grave criminal offence, it is to be presumed that intent is an element to be proved by the prosecution. In cases of possession, knowledge of the goods being in the accused’s custody is a necessary element and therefore knowledge must be proved by the prosecution.
In this case, the accused claimed that he did not know that he was in possession of heroin and therefore did not knowingly bring it into the country in contravention of the Customs Act.
Finding that the provision required proof of knowledge and intent, the court allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to determine the questions of knowledge and intent in accordance with the High Court’s judgment.
ON 7 JULY 2014, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered Hollingsworth v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 220.
The court dismissed a Notice of Motion in which Kim Hollingsworth, representing herself, sought to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of a District Court decision of Judge Neilson on an appeal from the Local Court. The decision related to ancillary orders made with respect to convictions under the NSW Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 regarding horses owned by, or in the care of, Ms Hollingsworth.
ON 26 JUNE 2014, the Senate Economics References Committee released it’s final report entitled Performance of Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
Of note, the committee found that there had been misconduct on the part of the advisors and planners within the Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s financial planning business and recommended that an enquiry, in the form of a judicial enquiry or Royal Commission, be established to investigate those matters as well as allegations of cover up.
It was recommended that the proposed inquiry identify the conduct amounting to breaches of law or professional standards and review all files to assess the appropriateness of the compensation process and the amounts of compensation offered by the bank.
The Bank’s CEO, Ian Narev, has apologised to the customers who received “poor advice” but and prefers to have an internal “independent” inquiry, called the Open Advice Review Program, rather than a Royal Commission.
The court held that the Commonwealth Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 did not authorise an examiner to require a person charged with a Commonwealth offence to answer questions before trial about the subject matter of the offence. Such action would fundamentally alter the balance of power towards the prosecution and represent a departure from the fair trial that the system requires. Such a requirement therefore could only be effected by express statutory language or necessary implication.