ON 18 FEBRUARY 2015, the United States Court of Military Commission Review delivered Hicks v United States of America CMCR 13-004.
Sydney, Australia
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ON 18 FEBRUARY 2015, the United States Court of Military Commission Review delivered Hicks v United States of America CMCR 13-004.
Sydney, Australia
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ON 18 FEBRUARY 2015, the NSW Court of Appeal delivered Monhem v Shields [2015] NSWCA 24 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2015/24.html.
The NSW Land and Environment Court made orders under the Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 that the appellants (the Monhems) remove a Camphor Laurel tree and pay for rectification works at their boundary with the respondents (Shields).
The Monhems did not attend the on-site hearing and subsequently applied, without success, to Sheahan J to have the orders set aside on the ground that the hearing had been held in their absence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed an application for leave to appeal stating that the the appellant had not demonstrated a proper basis for seeing aside Sheahan J’s judgment.
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The Family Court of Australia, Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia have jointly released The Australian Standards of Practice for Family Assessments and Reporting. The standards aim to:
To access the standards, visit http://www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/file/eb55680719c88d0/standards%20of%20practice_WEB_091214.pdf.
Sydney, Australia
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ON THIS DAY IN 1995, the High Court of Australia delivered Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1; (1995) 127 ALR 180 (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322 (16 February 1995).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/5.html
Per Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said at [6]:
“For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question whether the requisite causal connexion exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is essentially one of fact to be resolved, on the probabilities, as a matter of commonsense and experience. And that remains so in a case such as the present where the question of the existence of the requisite causal connexion is complicated by the intervention of some act or decision of the plaintiff …which constitutes a more immediate cause of the loss or damage. … If, in such a case, it can be seen that the necessary causal connexion would exist if the intervening act or decision be disregarded, the question of causation may often be conveniently expressed in terms of whether the intrusion of that act or decision has had the effect of breaking the chain of causation which would otherwise have existed between the breach of duty and the particular loss or damage. The ultimate question must, however, always be whether, notwithstanding the intervention of the subsequent decision, the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is, as between the plaintiff and the defendant and as a matter of commonsense and experience, properly to be seen as having caused the relevant loss or damage. Indeed, in some cases, it may be potentially misleading to pose the question of causation in terms of whether an intervening act or decision has interrupted or broken a chain of causation which would otherwise have existed. An example of such a case is where the negligent act or omission was itself a direct or indirect contributing cause of the intervening act or decision.”
Per McHugh J at [20]:
“However, the ultimate question is whether, as a matter of common sense, the financial loss that the plaintiff has suffered was caused by the plaintiff’s act in resigning his office rather than by the defendant’s negligence.”
Per McHugh J at [23]:
“The plaintiff’s complaints of pain and fatigue, his decreasing confidence in his own abilities, his belief that he was no longer teaching as well as he was before the accident and his inability to find time for research combine to make a strong case for concluding that his early retirement was not unreasonable. A defendant cannot reasonably require a plaintiff to remain in employment for the purpose of reducing the damages that the defendant would otherwise have to pay if to do so would interfere with the plaintiff’s reasonable enjoyment of life. The doctrine of mitigation of loss was not intended to turn injured plaintiffs into economic slaves.”
Sydney, Australia
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SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA
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ON THIS DAY IN 1986, the High Court of Australia delivered Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 (13 February 1986).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html
Per Mason J at 24:
“The first question to determine is whether the relationship between Brodribb and Gray was one of employer and employee or one of principal and independent contractor…A prominent factor in determining the nature of the relationship between a person who engages another to perform work and the person so engaged is the degree of control which the former can exercise over the latter. It has been held, however, that the
importance of control lies not so much in its actual exercise, although clearly that is relevant, as in the right of the employer to exercise it (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73; (1955) 93 CLR 561, at p 571;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett [1973] HCA 49; (1973) 129 CLR 395, at p 402; Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389). In the last-mentioned case Dixon J. said (at p 404):
“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions.”
But the existence of control, whilst significant, is not the sole criterion by which to gauge whether a relationship is one of employment. The approach of this Court has been to regard it merely as one of
a number of indicia which must be considered in the determination of that question (Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1945] HCA 13; (1945) 70 CLR 539, at p 552; Zuijs’ Case;
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Barrett, at p 401; Marshall v. Whittaker’s Building Supply Co. [1963] HCA 26; (1963) 109 CLR 210, at p 218). Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of
remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.”
Per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 35:
“The classic test for determining whether the relationship of master and servant exists has been one of control, the answer depending upon whether the engagement subjects the person engaged to the command of the person engaging him, not only as to what he shall do in the course of his employment but as to how he shall do it: Performing Right Society, Ld. v. Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse), Ld. (1924) 1 KB 762. The modern approach is, however, to have regard to a variety of criteria. This approach is not without its difficulties because not all of the accepted criteria provide a relevant test in all circumstances and none is conclusive. Moreover, the relationship itself remains largely undefined as a legal concept except in terms of the various criteria, the relevance of which may vary according to the circumstances.”
Per Brennan J:
“The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors’ respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.”
Sydney, Australia
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ON 12 FEBRUARY 2015, the High Court of Australia delivered Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Zhao [2015] HCA 5 (12 February 2015).
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/5.html
The second respondent had been charged with aiding and abetting another to deal with property or money that was the proceeds of crime. The first respondent was the second respondent’s wife and the registered proprietor of certain property that was the subject of the criminal proceedings.
The Australian Federal Police Commissioner brought restraint and forfeiture proceedings against the respondents under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) in the Victorian Couny Court. The respondents brought proceedings to exclude certain properties from restraint and forfeiture. Subsequently, on an application by the respondents, the Victorian Court of Appeal ordered a stay of the forfeiture and exclusion proceedings until the completion of the criminal proceedings.
The High Court of Australia dismissed an appeal by the Commissioner against the stay. It held that the Court of Appeal was correct to allow the stay because the the interests of justice would not be served by the second respondent being made to defend the forfeiture proceedings or pursue the exclusion proceedings before the completion of the criminal proceedings given that the offences and circumstances are substantially identical and especially when the appellant will suffer no relevant prejudice from the delay.
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